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All across the country, there was misery and rejoicing… All across the country, people felt unsafe. All across 
the country, people were laughing their heads off. All across the country, people felt legitimized. All across the 
country, people felt bereaved and shocked. All across the country, people felt righteous. All across the country, 
people felt sick. All across the country, people felt history at their shoulder. All across the country, people felt 
history meant nothing. All across the country, people felt like they counted for nothing… All across the country, 
things got nasty. All across the country, nobody spoke about it. All across the country, nobody spoke about 
anything else. All across the country, racist bile was general. All across the country, people said it wasn’t that 
they didn’t like immigrants. All across the country, people said it was about control. All across the country, 
everything changed overnight. All across the country, the have and have nots stayed the same. 
Ali Smith, Autumn (2016) 
 
Introduction 
The past five years in the United Kingdom have been a period marked by a number of 
referendums and elections, including the ‘Brexit’ vote (June 2016), the Article 50 notification 
(March 2017) and the ‘snap’ 2017 UK General Election that resulted in a hung parliament. In 
this paper, we take the opportunity to reflect on the relevance to management and 
organisation studies (MOS) of the decision – taken through a majority vote of 51.89% – that 
the UK should leave the European Union. The reflections we present are informed by our 
professional identification as well as our personal views, observations and experiences. We 
are MOS academics but more importantly, we are citizens and employees. We work and live 
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in Britain, and are worried about what has been happening in this country – not least because 
of our strong commitment to the project of a United Europe and to our political position as 
‘remainers’.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given our own scholarly interests and political beliefs, ever since the 
pre-Brexit referendum campaign we have been preoccupied by following the unfolding 
Brexit process, paying particular attention to its potential effects on organisations based in the 
UK. Consequently, we have been trying to familiarise ourselves with as much information, as 
many opinions and speculations as possible to understand better what is going on, and how 
Brexit has been influencing and is going to continue to influence organisations and those 
working in them. This ‘Speaking Out’ article constitutes an attempt on our part to put 
forward suggestions for MOS researchers – including ourselves – for studying the 
organisational consequences of ‘Brexit’. 
Already, the Brexit process is producing a broad range of effects on organisations and 
individuals: workers, volunteers, activists, students – in other words, all citizens – and the 
economy. These impacts are widening, deepening and diversifying (e.g. BBC 2018; CIPD 
2018; Institute for Employment Studies 2018; KPMG 2017; Major 2018; Musaddique 2017; 
The Economist 2017). Such changes present MOS scholars with a duty to study Brexit, while 
simultaneously posing an important challenge: how do we start to research, conceptualise and 
shape this wide, complex phenomenon in the making, and the subsequent crises which may 
ensue? 
The Brexit debate 
We have followed journalistic and academic blogs (e.g. Chris Grey, David Allen Green, 
Steve Peers, Frances Coppola, Adam Tooze) and twitter feeds (e.g. Ian Dunt, Stephen Bush, 
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‘Sime0n Stylites’, Prof. Tanja Bueltmann), as well as the emerging academic literature on the 
topic. Two basic perspectives can be found in the academic papers and books published to 
date. These are summed up by Blyth and Matthijs (2017) as first, a macro, structural 
perspective and second, a cultural identity perspective. The first of these argues that 
phenomena such as the Brexit referendum result, the election of Donald Trump as US 
President and similar ‘populist’ political movements, are symptomatic of what Mark Blyth 
calls ‘global Trumpism’. These populist movements can be seen as socio-political reactions 
to the post-2008 crisis of neoliberalism that both revealed and exacerbated the unsolved 
contradictions inherent in the economics of globalisation. As a populist movement, then, 
Brexit can be understood as a response to the structural causes of insecurity, including debt 
and wage suppression, and the growth of inequality and precarity within capitalist economies 
(Piketty 2014; Tooze 2018).  
From the perspective of cultural identity, reactionary populism (Fraser 2017) is considered 
the political expression and mobilisation of ressentiment (Weber 1922/1966, drawing on 
Nietzsche 1887/1994). Ressentiment as a concept designates a feeling of powerlessness that 
permeates certain social groups (Bourdieu 2016; Brown 1993), be it the underprivileged, in 
which case the group members will have a sense that their increasingly precarious economic 
status is threatened by invasive ‘outsiders’; or be it the relatively privileged, who feel that 
they are being unjustly denied their rightful position of socio-cultural dominance due to a 
perceived dual cultural threat from alien ‘others’ and the machinations of unaccountable 
‘elites’. As a social process, then, ressentiment is directed against two discursively 
constructed categories of people: the liberal, metropolitan, transnational ‘elites’; and 
‘immigrants’.  
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Therefore, in terms of Brexit, we can argue that ressentiment, understood as a powerful 
festering shared emotion, was used by the Leave movement’s strategists to mobilise the votes 
of two different fractions of society: 1) members of the traditional working class who feel 
themselves economically deprived and ‘left behind’ (see e.g. Pettifor 2017) by de-
industrialisation and financialisation (ascribed to globalisation as promoted by economic 
elites); and 2) the relatively economically privileged who feel that (what they perceive as) 
their ‘native, white’ social and cultural dominance (Demir 2017; Golec de Zavala et al. 2017) 
has been threatened by ‘multiculturalism’ in the form of an influx of people speaking 
different languages, eating different foods and following different religions. According to the 
cultural identity perspective then, the negative feelings associated with ressentiment emerge 
as racist and xenophobic attitudes among members of these predominantly white English 
groups which, in turn, have been translated into tangible actions with tangible consequences.  
Both mainstream media and academic sources report on and analyse such actions in the 
context of Brexit. For example, while racism and xenophobia have always been present in 
British society (see e.g. Nairn 1970 on the career of right-wing politician Enoch Powell), 
Brexit seems to have re-legitimised and amplified the expression of such feelings and 
behaviours associated with them, leading to a significant increase in different forms of abuse 
and attacks on foreign-looking and foreign-language speaking UK residents in all walks of 
public life including workplaces (e.g. BBC 2017; Khalili 2017; Sime 2018; Virdee and 
McGeever 2018).  
On the other hand, there is also evidence of strong feelings against racism and xenophobia 
post the Brexit referendum, and mobilisation of efforts to counter such forces by a large 
number of British residents. This is exemplified by campaigns and movements such as the 3  
Million, In Limbo and the work of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants. To us, 
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this points to the need to find an analytical framework that brings together the structural and 
cultural perspectives and that we can use to highlight the importance of emotions and 
identities in the context of Brexit – a theme we return to below, as we put forward proposals 
regarding the possible directions for ‘org-studying’ Brexit.   
The importance of ‘org-studying’ Brexit 
Brexit, a complex and multi-faceted social and political phenomenon, will have more long-
term effects on workplaces, the people within them, and on the nature of management and 
organisations within the UK than any other single event in recent history. As MOS scholars – 
regardless of whether we self-identify as ‘leavers’ or ‘remainers’ – we need to engage in the 
important task of studying these issues. We must build a deep and rich understanding of how 
Brexit and reactions to it have and will influence management and organisations, and strive 
through our research to make a positive impact on the nature of – and on managing and 
organising within – the (post-)Brexit workplace. In this regard, our task involves, for 
example, the exploration of how employees, managers, entrepreneurs, professional groups 
and organisations make sense of and respond to Brexit-related changes, and manoeuvre 
effectively within the emerging environment. Such studies also need to include how workers, 
volunteers, activists, and students – in particular in the case of higher education – as well as 
wider community members, are affected by the actions of organisations and organising 
processes in the context of Brexit.   
Our challenge as scholars is also to examine the interconnections within and between the 
different levels at which Brexit manifests itself – for example, through examining the link 
between the decline of civic engagement in the UK, the feelings of ressentiment and 
powerlessness that have contributed to the conjuncture of Brexit, and the ways in which these 
phenomena influence organisational cultures and interpersonal relationships in all types of 
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workplaces and organisations. It is, in addition, necessary for MOS researchers to consider 
possible future scenarios in relation to Brexit and its impact on management and 
organisations, and to develop ways of addressing the multifaceted organisational and societal 
consequences of Brexit as they unfold. 
Below, we put forward recommendations for how we might approach the study of Brexit, and 
suggest exploring its complexities through applying approaches which have been gaining 
currency amongst MOS scholars as offering rich and nuanced insights into organisations, 
individuals and groups within them, and the broader society. In particular, we call for 
developing ways for studying Brexit by seeking inspiration from Bourdieu’s thinking on 
crisis, enriched by insights from research into emotions and identities in organisations, to 
develop an understanding of the interconnected impacts of Brexit on society, organisations 
and people within them.   
Org-studying the emotions of Brexit  
As the Brexit referendum approached in June 2016, the Leave and Remain campaigns strove 
to mobilise votes using a rhetoric constructed to appeal to the electorate as a whole, or 
targeted at key sub-groups, identified by opinion surveys and focus groups as particularly 
open to influence. While both campaigns drew on a mixture of ‘rational’ and ‘emotional’ 
arguments, the rhetoric of the Leave campaign framed reasons to vote against the 
continuation of Britain’s membership in the EU to a large extent through an emotive rhetoric 
that resonated with the ‘gut feelings’ of many who were inclined to vote ‘leave’. It articulated 
ideas about the allegedly negative impact of migration on the economy and society, 
expressing feelings of ressentiment towards foreign ‘others’, and framing the British workers 
as victims of the EU expansion. This was exemplified by the stereotype of European migrants 
taking jobs away from the British people; calls for ‘taking back control’ and regaining 
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‘autonomy’; and the notion that EU membership is a drain on the NHS and the main reason 
behind wage stagnation (e.g. Lee 2016; Reynolds 2016; Vote Leave 2016).  
By contrast, the Remain campaign’s rhetoric was not built around an appeal to voters’ 
positive emotions about the EU and a wish for the UK to remain part of it1 (Korski 2016), but 
rather on inciting fear of the economic consequences of leaving. For example, pro-‘remain’ 
messages did not try to evoke in the British people a sense of relief, joy and appreciation that 
thanks to the EU the country has not experienced a war on its territory since the end of WW2; 
that democracy has advanced throughout Europe; and that thanks to EU legislation worker 
protection rights have been gained by workers in Britain (e.g. Behr 2016; Cave 2016; Jackson 
et al. 2016). Rather, the Remain campaign deployed mainly an appeal to ‘factual’ and 
‘rational economic’ arguments that demonstrated the potentially negative consequences of 
Britain’s leaving the EU, especially in terms of its economic impacts (e.g. Cabinet Office 
2016; Cassidy 2016; The Economist 2016).  
The approach adopted in the Leave campaign’s rhetoric, i.e. an attempt to directly connect 
with how ‘ordinary people’ feel, without much concern about ensuring that the arguments 
used would come across as ‘rational’ and ‘evidence-based’, was a typical example of a 
populist argumentation (Krämer 2017). Populism, after all, is often openly anti-intellectual in 
its claims (Bourdieu, 2016; White, 1962). Therefore, in the case of the Brexit referendum, 
adopting a predominantly emotions-laden rhetoric was a skilful strategy that resonated with 
sections of a public whose factual knowledge about the EU and Britain’s status within it was 
in any case very low (e.g. Elgot 2016; Hix 2015; Peck 2016). As such, British voters were 
more likely to respond to an argumentation that focused primarily on how they felt – and that 
promised that they would feel better as a consequence of casting their vote in a particular way 
– rather than on building on what they knew as far as ‘facts’ were concerned.  
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If we accept that the decision to leave was, to a large extent, a response to a rhetoric that drew 
on people’s emotions, then what follows is a need to consider Brexit as an emotional 
phenomenon that has affected the British electorate, regardless of whether they voted to 
‘remain’ or ‘leave’ – and one that, by extension, will continue to exert a strong emotional 
impact on people and their identities, both in the broader society and in organisations. We 
therefore suggest including ideas about emotions and identities in organisations, stemming 
from a body of literature that has its roots in the recognition that emotions infuse all aspects 
of social life (Fineman 2003; McCarthy 1994; Solomon 1993), in our proposed framework 
for researching the organisational consequences of Brexit.  
Org-studying the Brexit crisis  
As we have argued above, Brexit has been exerting a significant emotional impact on people, 
be it ‘leave’ or ‘remain’ voters, as well as those who – like those Europeans living in the UK 
who do not hold British citizenship – were unable to vote and yet have been personally 
affected by the referendum result. In this sense, Brexit can be seen as a crisis and a source of 
emotional shock for individuals. Indeed, in the context of Brexit, references to crisis and 
shock are also appropriate in relation to aspects other than emotions. According to Tooze 
(2018), the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was the initial spark that set off a decade-long 
series of economic, social and political shocks of which Brexit is but one. If that is the case, 
then it might be argued that the original abdication of responsibility by MOS scholars in 
general and CMS scholars in particular was a failure to adequately address the causes and  
effects of the GFC in relation to leaders, managers and organisations (a point made with 
some force by Tourish 2015).  
This failure might suggest that CMS scholars now have an even greater responsibility to 
engage critically with Brexit and other forms of contemporary Euro-American populism, 
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both as to how such movements are organised politically and as to their effects within 
organisations – alongside whatever political engagement each individual thinks appropriate. 
Such an understanding requires us to draw on interdisciplinary resources in developing an 
overall theoretical approach that situates the conflicting emotions roiling around Brexit 
within organisations and in relation to both economic and cultural forces. To do this we 
propose a relational and structured model that draws more widely on the social sciences. One 
way forward here would be to work with Pierre Bourdieu’s (1988) approach to crisis analysis 
as developed by Gisèle Sapiro (2013; 2014), and to combine it with relevant work on 
emotions and identities in organisations.  
Calls to extend Bourdieusian approaches in critical management and organisation studies 
have led to a growing literature on topics such as organisations and crisis (e.g. Kerr and 
Robinson 2012), the accounting profession (e.g. Spence and Carter 2014), elites (e.g. 
Maclean et al. 2014), management education (e.g. Vaara and Faÿ 2012), management control 
(e.g. Kamoche, Kannan and Siebers 2014); gender and leadership (Elliott and Stead 2018); 
language (Śliwa and Johansson 2015), and architecture, symbolic power and space (Kerr and 
Robinson 2016). Such studies have employed the full range of Bourdieusian concepts: field, 
forms of capital, habitus, symbolic violence, and so on. In light of this growing body of work, 
we suggest that Bourdieu’s conceptual framework provides a way of beginning to make sense 
of the historical moment of Brexit that we are living through.  
Likewise, there is by now a rich body of literature addressing emotions and identities from an 
MOS perspective. For example, of relevance to our analysis of Brexit is existing work that 
considers how processes of identity construction are influenced by emotions (e.g. Brown 
2015; Jenkins 2008; Sturdy et al. 2006), and that draws attention to the way in which 
challenging situations present a threat to an individual’s socially constructed identity, giving 
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rise to a range of negative emotions including anger, anxiety and worry (e.g. Ibarra and 
Petriglieri 2007; Thomas and Linstead 2002). Also, importantly for our analysis, MOS 
scholars have studied the emotional impact of actual and expected shifts to careers and roles, 
such as uncertainty, insecurity, anxiety, irritability, shock and a sense of vulnerability (e.g. 
Ibarra and Petriglieri 2007; LaPointe 2013; Muhr 2012; Pullen 2006; Raghuram 2013) as 
well as, by contrast, excitement and enjoyment (Empson 2013). 
The proposed approach to researching Brexit and populism has a number of benefits. For 
example, Bourdieu’s analytical concept the field of power (Bourdieu 2012) allows us to 
distance ourselves from the strategic uses of ‘elite’ in populist discourse and makes possible a 
more differentiated analysis of socio-economic power and where it lies in the nexus of  media 
ownership, politics and money in the UK. In addition, Bourdieu’s concept of the political 
field enables us to analyse how political positions, dispositions and manoeuvrings have been 
driven by wider socio-economic crises in the wake of the GFC. This in turn allows us to 
question the utility of ‘populism’ as an analytical concept, given its widespread use as a 
political and cultural weapon, and to suggest instead that populism is better understood as a 
political methodology operationalised by demagogues to mobilise forms of ressentiment. 
In developing Bourdieu’s approach to crisis analysis, we draw in particular on Sapiro (2013; 
2014). In her studies of the historical-empirical case of France in the 1940s, Sapiro shows 
how the external shock of French military defeat and German occupation in 1940 constituted 
a crisis of national identity that transposed into a crisis in the political field that allowed the 
formation of the right-wing Vichy regime. This crisis then transposed into the literary field 
with the ascent of Vichy-supporting authors and their associated infrastructure of publishers 
and journals.  
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Applied to Brexit, Sapiro’s approach to crisis enables us, as MOS scholars, to research Brexit 
and its consequences systematically as, first, economic and social crisis (macro level); then as 
transposed into the field-level (meso level) as a crisis of organised politics; and finally, as 
transposed and experienced at the individual and interpersonal level, as a crisis of individual 
identities and interpersonal relationships (micro level). This approach allows us to develop an 
understanding of the crisis as dynamic and unfolding, and specifically requires an 
understanding of the interrelations between levels of analysis. In this way we can track how 
the initial external economic shock of the GFC has been and continues to be transposed 
across society and the social fields of which it is comprised (such as politics, banking and 
finance, health care, and higher education; for some implications of Brexit for Critical 
Management Studies, see Grey 2018 in this journal).  
Following this model, then, at macro level Brexit was a conjuncture that brought together 
various structural forces – demographic changes, economic crisis, globalisation – that, as we 
noted above, contributed to the spread of economic and cultural insecurity (Tooze 2018). 
However, public understanding of these macro processes and structures depends in part on 
how these processes are interpreted and classified by ‘producers of the discursive 
representation of the social world’ (Bourdieu 2016: 1074). These experts include academics 
and policy entrepreneurs whose ‘neutral’, euphemised classifications, such as ‘somewheres 
and anywheres’ (Goodhart 2017), or ‘the left behind’, are translated into the public sphere as 
values- and emotions-laden group and individual identities (‘citizens of nowhere’, or 
‘immigrants’).  
Further, the idea of the ‘left-behind’ has been racialised as ‘the white working class’, a 
categorisation that redefines class as a racial category and in so doing disregards the 75% of 
voters of colour – most of whom might be considered working class – who voted to ‘remain’ 
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(Emejulu 2018; see also the critique of the ‘white working class’ concept by Bhambra 2017). 
Such discursive constructions which euphemise powerful social forces (Bourdieu 1996) can 
be used by politicians, their strategists and their media allies in the field of power to mobilise 
populations by appealing to their emotions. The fact that membership of the EU guarantees 
freedom of movement for all EU citizens meant that EU citizens in the UK could not be 
categorised and controlled as ‘immigrants’, and the presence of EU citizens was used to 
capitalise on ressentiment, to market emotions, and to construct threats to nativist social 
identities.  
The macro social and economic crisis was then transposed into sets of field-specific crises. In 
the political field, in order to counter the right-wing threat from UKIP (United Kingdom 
Independence Party), the Conservative government promised to reduce immigration into the 
UK to fewer than 100,000 per year (Grierson 2018). This policy, operationalised as the so-
called ‘hostile environment’2, was introduced in 2012 and overseen by Theresa May as Home 
Secretary. It involved sending vans with ‘go home or face arrest’ on the side into sensitive 
areas, and enrolling landlords, employers, and others to limit immigrants’ access to work, 
housing, health care, bank accounts, etc3. Agents in these fields were forced to be the 
equivalent of border guards. 
This provides evidence of how agents in the political field both contribute to the perpetuation 
of a structural xenophobia, a sort of emotional Zeitgeist compounded of fear, ressentiment 
and insecurity, and to its transposition into social fields and into wider society. Fields are also 
emotional landscapes, and mobilisation of the emotional Zeitgeist was central to the political 
decision to call a referendum, to the Brexit campaign (in the course of which Labour MP Jo 
Cox was assassinated), and, post-Brexit, has continued to metastasise in the form of political 
and press campaigns against ‘citizens of nowhere’, the ‘elite’, ‘cosmopolitans’, etc. The 
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derogatory connotations of these categorisations and the feelings of contempt and resentment 
towards those to whom these labels are applied draw our attention to the importance of 
classification struggles and the imposition of identity as a form of symbolic violence.  
We can also see how emotion operates at first, the macro level in the form of a general 
emotional Zeitgeist, and then at a meso level as collective feelings mobilised and directed 
against those identified as minority groups. This is where we can next extend the 
Bourdieu/Sapiro analysis of Brexit into the study of the everyday life of organisations by 
bringing in the consideration of emotions in relation to individuals and relationships. In doing 
so, we contribute to a theoretical enrichment and empirical applicability of Bourdieu’s work 
which has previously been criticised for under-theorising emotions and eliding the more 
nuanced effects of emotions and identities at individual and group level (see e.g., Reay 2015).  
By incorporating emotions and identities into an overall Bourdieusian approach we should, as 
organisation scholars, be able to explore how Brexit is transposed from macro to meso level 
and experienced at micro level. Here, we can use emotions and extend the role of identities in 
applying the concept of habitus (Bourdieu 2016), understood as the learned social 
dispositions that allow us to operate as embodied individuals in the familiar and shared 
everyday world and in the various fields in which we are professionally invested (Bourdieu 
calls this investment illusio). Research at this level can also show how our social trajectory – 
our history – is embodied in habitus as bodily hexis (Bourdieu 1980; Kerr and Robinson 
2009): that is, in our physical being, the durable ways we present ourselves physically and 
interact with others, including everyday gestures, ways of standing, speaking, walking. 
Habitus also incorporates ways of thinking (oedos) and valuing (ethos) (Bourdieu 1984); 
however, it does not – or not explicitly – deal with emotions, understood as ways of feeling 
and relating to the world. Focusing on emotions and identities at micro level would add depth 
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and insight to complement the macro and meso level analyses, contributing a fine-grained 
understanding of how Brexit is experienced by individuals in their everyday lives; how Brexit 
is affecting their official identity and personal sense of identity (professional, personal and 
political); and what their planned and imagined futures may be.  
The related concept of hysteresis (Bourdieu 1980; Kerr and Robinson 2009) helps explain the 
consequences of meso level shock (i.e., field level) at the micro level (i.e., the habitus, which 
links the meso and micro levels). In this context, the hysteresis effect relates to a crisis of 
individual and collective identity; evoking a sense of disconnection between the individual 
and the no-longer familiar everyday social world, in situations when social identities are 
changed by powerful external forces (to e.g.,‘immigrant’), resulting in feelings of 
disorientation, loss, grief and rage that can result at the organisational level in 
accommodation, resistance, withdrawal, or exit.   
Crisis disrupts familiar interpretations of the world and established social identities. It affects 
how individuals feel and act, both in their private and working lives. It makes the political 
(painfully) personal: in the context of Brexit and in relation to you as an EU citizen in the 
UK, it may make you modify your bodily hexis, your day-to-day behaviour. For example, 
you may decide not to draw attention to yourself as ‘foreign’, be it at work, in the street or, if 
you are a student, in the educational institution you attend. You may do this through opting to 
self-censor your speech by not speaking in your first language in public (see e.g., Forrest 
2018). This is because, on the streets and in other public places, EU citizens risk being 
subjected to individual acts of aggression on the grounds of their ‘foreignness’. The Brexit 
campaign and the referendum result have licensed the extension of racism and xenophobia to 
include more citizens as alien ‘others’. This, in turn, has affected all types of organisations, 
including workplaces. Colleagues might have become less open and more suspicious towards 
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each other; some might have decided – or will decide – to leave UK-based organisations, in 
order to live and work in the EU.  
This example of Bourdieusian analysis shows how social and economic changes at the macro 
level can be interpreted and imposed as a ‘vision of the world’ at meso level, disrupting 
social fields, and how this transposition has further effects at the micro level. For how to do 
this, we might look at the example of La misère du monde (Bourdieu 1993), in which 
Bourdieu and his associates present a research project that, through interviews and social 
analyses, demonstrates the ramifying effects of neoliberal economic policies on the everyday 
lives of individuals. 
Of course, we recognise the complexities involved in conucting research at macro, miso and 
micro levels. However, we argue that the approach outlines in this paper provides us with a 
theoretical orientation, an initial guide to an understanding of the social world, one that will 
allow organisational scholarsto ground investigations into these ongoing multi-level crises. 
Org-studying Brexit, then, could build a theoretical space that brings together the recently 
popular among MOS scholars Bourdieusian approaches with the growing literature on 
emotions and identities in organisations. This might also allow MOS scholars to track the 
mobilisation of ressentiment (what we have called the emotional Zeitgeist) in the rise of 
populism as a political methodology and its effects in and on organisations in contemporary 
Europe and the United States. Specifically in the UK, we might look at the reconfiguration of 
politics around, and the emotional investment in, new emerging identity formations, that may 
in turn contribute to a reorientation of the political field by social and political movements 
campaigning for the cancelation of Brexit or, failing that, campaigning to rejoin the EU.  
Final remarks 
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A scholar’s duty is not only to conduct research that is relevant and meaningful to society. It 
is also to speak out from a position that recognises that academia is part of this society, and 
that neither the academic field nor the identities of academics are insulated from broader 
social phenomena, shocks and crises. Brexit, as no other recent event in the UK, proves this 
point. The referendum result has caused a shock and crisis within the entire academic field 
and has led to politicisation of individual academics’ identities along the ‘leaver’/‘remainer’ 
divide (for example, our clearly stated position as ‘remainers’), which is part of how Brexit is 
being transposed into the academic field. It has also given rise to complex and often intense 
emotions that, as with members of other organisations in the UK, impact academics as 
university employees and managers. These newly politicised academic identities and 
intensified emotions also influence how MOS researchers perceive society as the subject of 
their study, including their own contributions to the classification struggles outlined above.  
In this paper we have suggested how UK-based MOS academics might – as scholars – begin 
to engage with Brexit as a process that they are forced to undergo: an understanding of how 
Brexit, while a highly emotional phenomenon, might be situated as one crisis in an ongoing 
series of economic, social, political and personal crises from the GFC onward and how we 
might begin to track these circuits of emotions and identities that contribute to forming and 
reforming field and habitus; showing how identities are constructed, coercively imposed and 
emotionally resisted.  
We are calling for ‘org-studying’ Brexit not because we see it as an ‘academic’ issue, in the 
colloquial sense of the term, but because it is the most impactful, worrying and painful event 
we have encountered in Europe in our lifetimes; one that will continue to influence us all: as 
engaged citizens, members of organisations, scholars and – above all – human beings. Truly 
‘taking back control’ – as the Leave campaign slogan would urge us to – would necessitate 
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taking seriously the democratic deficit, not just in formal politics, but in our everyday lives. 
Let’s study Brexit then, and in so doing try to minimise – and perhaps even reverse – the 
damage done by Brexit to us, our organisations and society. 
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1 Anti-neoliberal discourses were also mobilised by left-wing ‘lexiteers’, often influenced by 
the fate of Greece in the sovereign debt crisis (Tooze 2018), but also by opponents of 
‘globalism’ influenced by the American alt-Right. 
 
2 Now (2018) euphemised as the ‘compliant environment’. 
 
3 In the case of the ‘Windrush’ generation who came from the Caribbean to the UK in the 
1950s, this involved the reclassification of legal citizens as illegal immigrants.  
 
                                                     
